DOCUMENT GUIDE — INFORMATION LAID BEFORE A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

Jurisdiction: Province of Ontario · Criminal Code, s. 504, Form 2

Informant: Martin Lamothe, natural person, citoyen de droit, Heir by ligeantia naturalis, Province of Ontario

Accused: 30 named persons — Ministers of Justice, Attorneys General, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Public Safety, RCMP Commissioners, Directors of Public Prosecutions, and Crown counsel — each named in their personal capacity as natural persons who swore an oath to the Crown and its Heirs

Counts: 1 — Breach of Trust (s. 122) · 2 — Fraud (s. 380(1)) · 3 — Obstructing Justice (s. 139(2)) · 4 — Disobeying a Statute (s. 126(1)) · 5 — Extortion (s. 346(1)) · 6 — Participation in a Criminal Organization (ss. 467.1, 467.11)

Particulars: 18 numbered Particulars establishing the pre-Confederation liberty, the cross-statutory record, the taxonomy of encroachment mechanisms, and the constitutional prohibition on extinguishment, licensing, and leasing of Heir liberties

Evidence: Items (a)–(p) — entirely from the public record and Crown's own instruments, self-authenticating under the Canada Evidence Act · Schedule 1: two cryptographically authenticated Crown emails (DKIM/DMARC/SPF verified)

Notice given: Email to Attorney General of Canada, April 12, A.D. 2026 · Ottawa Citizen legal notice, Order No. OTC013118, April 13–14, A.D. 2026 · commonlawcanada.ca, live from April 12, A.D. 2026

Quod non habet principium non habet finem · commonlawcanada.ca

CANADA

PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

INFORMATION

(Criminal Code, s. 504, Form 2)

IN THE MATTER OF

An Information laid before a Justice of the Peace

in and for the Province of Ontario

INFORMANT: Martin Lamothe, acting in his private capacity, a natural person, *citoyen de droit*, rightful Heir to Canada's constitutional order by lineage, bound by natural allegiance (*ligeantia naturalis*), and holding the common law liberties inherited at birth, of the Province of Ontario — appearing as Informant on behalf of the Crown and in the interest of the constitutional order, pursuant to section 504 of the Criminal Code, under full and unwavering allegiance to the Crown and its constitutional order. The Crown owes to the Informant, as to all Heirs, the protection of the pre-existing liberties of the constitutional order. This Information is sworn in vindication of that obligation.

THE ACCUSED

The informant says that the following persons, each identified as a natural person and not by office alone, each of whom has sworn at least one Oath bearing allegiance to the Crown and to Canada's Heirs and Successors — one oath being sufficient to engage the obligation in its entirety — have committed indictable offences against the laws of Canada:

Oath of Allegiance (prescribed form, Fifth Schedule, Constitution Act, 1867) — sworn to His Majesty King Charles III:

> *"I, [name], do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King Charles the Third, His Heirs and Successors, according to law. So help me God."*

Oath of Allegiance (prescribed form, Fifth Schedule, Constitution Act, 1867) — sworn to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II (former Monarch, d. 2022):

> *"I, [name], do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors, according to law. So help me God."*

It is a prerequisite of the constitutional order of Canada that those who offer themselves for Crown offices must swear an Oath of Allegiance before assuming the powers of that office. The oath is not a formality that follows appointment — it is the condition upon which the office itself is constitutionally valid. Each accused could only have held, and exercised, the powers of the office by virtue of having first sworn. Every act taken under those powers — including the conduct alleged herein — was therefore taken under the oath, and remains subject to it. The oath binds each accused to the Crown and to the whole of what the Crown represents: not merely the sovereign line, but the constitutional order the Crown holds in trust, and the natural persons — the *citoyen de droit* — whose pre-existing liberties that order exists to protect, not to

extinguish. That obligation does not expire upon leaving office. There is no instrument by which it is unsworn. The matter is live as against each accused named herein, whether currently in office or not. One oath, sworn once, engages that entire obligation. There is no un-oath.

A. Ministers of Justice and Attorneys General of Canada

FAC Era (1977–1995) — Certification regime conditioning a pre-existing liberty on administrative permission:

1. Otto Lang, Attorney General of Canada (1978)

2. Jean Chrétien, Attorney General of Canada (1980–1982)

3. Donald Johnston, Attorney General of Canada (1984)

4. John Crosbie, Attorney General of Canada (1984–1986)

5. Douglas Lewis, Attorney General of Canada (1989–1990)

6. Kim Campbell, Attorney General of Canada (1990–1993)

7. Pierre Blais, Attorney General of Canada (1993)

Firearms Act Era (1995–present) — Comprehensive licensing regime substituting revocable permission for constitutional liberty:

8. Allan Rock, Attorney General of Canada (1993–1997) — *oversaw enactment of Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39*

9. Anne McLellan, Attorney General of Canada (1997–2002) — *oversaw implementation of PAL regime and firearms registry*

10. Martin Cauchon, Attorney General of Canada (2002–2003)

11. Irwin Cotler, Attorney General of Canada (2003–2006)

12. Vic Toews, Attorney General of Canada (2006–2007)

13. Robert Nicholson, Attorney General of Canada (2007–2013)

14. Peter MacKay, Attorney General of Canada (2013–2015)

15. Jody Wilson-Raybould, Attorney General of Canada (2015–2019)

16. David Lametti, Attorney General of Canada (2019–2023) — *signed Charter Statement for C-21 under s. 4.1 certifying no inconsistency*

17. Arif Virani, Attorney General of Canada (2023–2025) — *AG when C-21 received Royal Assent*

18. Gary Anandasangaree, Attorney General of Canada (2025)

19. Sean Fraser, Attorney General of Canada (2025–present) — *first AG to receive express notice of constitutional deficiency; continuation after notice constitutes actual knowledge*

B. Prime Ministers of Canada

20. Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada (2015–2025) — *ordered May 1, 2020 OIC (SOR/2020-96) prohibiting 1,500+ firearms models by executive decree without Parliamentary vote; announced and directed C-21*

21. Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada (2025–present) — *continuing all impugned instruments under oath without objection; permitting buyback to proceed toward amnesty expiry (October 30, 2026) and criminal prosecution of Heirs for possession of property held under a constitutional liberty*

C. Ministers of Public Safety

22. William Blair, Minister of Public Safety (2019–2021) — *oversaw May 2020 OIC; alleged coordination with RCMP Commissioner to leverage Nova Scotia massacre for gun control legislation*

23. Marco Mendicino, Minister of Public Safety (2021–2023) — *introduced Bill C-21 in Parliament*

24. Dominic LeBlanc, Minister of Public Safety (2023–2024)

25. Gary Anandasangaree, Minister of Public Safety (2025–present) — *administering Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program (buyback); admitted on recorded call that buyback is politically motivated by Quebec voter sentiment*

D. Commissioners of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

26. Brenda Lucki, Commissioner of the RCMP (2018–2023) — *oversaw RCMP enforcement of May 2020 OIC; alleged pressure on RCMP to release Nova Scotia firearms details to advance gun control agenda at behest of PMO and Minister Blair*

27. Michael Duheme, Commissioner of the RCMP (2023–present) — *continuing enforcement of impugned instruments through Canadian Firearms Program*

E. Crown Counsel and Officers of the Court

Every person who, holding a valid licence to practise law issued by a Law Society of a province or territory of Canada and having sworn an oath as an officer of the court, prosecuted, conducted, instructed, or authorized the prosecution of any natural person — a rightful Heir to Canada's constitutional order — under the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, its predecessor instruments, or the Criminal Code provisions relating to firearms, where the effect of such prosecution was to criminalize the exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty that no Parliament created and no Parliament had authority to deny.

The following persons are named as accused in their personal capacity as Directors of Public Prosecutions who directed, authorized, or permitted the prosecution of Heirs under the impugned instruments during their respective tenures:

28. Brian J. Saunders, Q.C., Director of Public Prosecutions (2006–2016) — founding Director of the PPSC; directed federal firearms prosecutions throughout his tenure under the Firearms Act regime.

29. Kathleen Roussel, Director of Public Prosecutions (2017–2023) — directed federal firearms prosecutions; publicly maintained prosecutorial independence while the PPSC continued to prosecute Heirs under constitutionally void instruments.

30. George Dolhai, Director of Public Prosecutions (2024–present) — current Director; continuing to direct prosecutions under the impugned instruments after receipt of express notice of constitutional deficiency on April 12–14, A.D. 2026.

The class of accused in Section E further includes, without limitation: every Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions who held office under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9; every Senior General Counsel and Crown counsel employed by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada who conducted such prosecutions; every Crown Attorney employed by a provincial Attorney General who prosecuted firearms offences against Heirs under agreements with the federal Attorney General; and every Chief

Firearms Officer who revoked, refused, or conditioned a firearms licence held by an Heir, thereby denying the exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty under colour of instruments that are *void ab initio*.

The identification of additional persons within this class is a matter for the prosecuting authority upon investigation. This Information reserves the right of the informant to amend to add named accused as they are identified. Each such person is accused in their personal capacity as a natural person who held a valid law licence, swore an oath, and deployed the coercive apparatus of the state against persons over whom the impugned instruments have no constitutional jurisdiction.

COUNTS

COUNT 1 — Breach of Trust by Public Officer

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 122

That the accused, each being an official within the meaning of section 122 of the Criminal Code, did, knowingly or having no lawful excuse, commit a breach of trust in connection with the duties of their office, in that they:

> (a) failed to identify, recognize, or act upon a constitutionally protected liberty — predating Confederation, received into constitutional protection by the Constitution Act, 1867, and shielded by section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 — which was being denied, systematically and incrementally, by the instruments they were sworn to uphold, administer, or enforce;
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> (b) permitted, authorized, instructed, or failed to prevent the enforcement of the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, and its predecessor instruments, as against natural persons who are rightful Heirs to Canada's constitutional order, bound by natural allegiance (*ligeantia naturalis*), and holding common law liberties inherited at birth — persons over whom the impugned instruments have no constitutional jurisdiction;
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> (c) failed to discharge the duty inherent in their commission to verify the constitutional validity of the Acts they signed, defended, administered, or enforced, thereby permitting the substitution of a revocable statutory permission for a constitutionally protected liberty;
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> (d) in the case of each Attorney General, failed to report to the House of Commons the inconsistency of the impugned instruments with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as required by section 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-2;

contrary to section 122 of the Criminal Code.

COUNT 2 — Fraud

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 380(1)

That the accused, knowingly or having no lawful excuse, by deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, did defraud the public, or any person, of property, money, or valuable security, or any service, in that they:

> (a) extracted licence fees, renewal fees, registration costs, and other monetary charges from natural persons — the Heirs — as a condition of the exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty that no Parliament created and no Parliament had authority to condition, the said extraction having been accomplished through the induced compliance of the Heirs under threat of criminal prosecution for the exercise of the liberty;
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> (b) caused or permitted the seizure, confiscation, and proposed destruction of lawfully held firearms and arms under the authority of instruments that are *void ab initio* as against the Heirs, including the May 1, 2020 Order in Council (SOR/2020-96) and the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program established thereunder;

(c) obtained and retained the proceeds of the licensing and registration regime without lawful authority — the juristic reason for the enrichment being absent, the instruments having had no constitutional authority to reach the Heirs — thereby effecting an unjust enrichment of the Crown at the expense of the Heirs;

(d) in the case of the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program, administering a program of compensation for the surrender of property under instruments that have no constitutional authority to compel such surrender, the program being founded upon a legal nullity;

contrary to section 380(1) of the Criminal Code.

COUNT 3 — Obstructing Justice

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 139(2)

That the accused did, knowingly or having no lawful excuse, wilfully attempt to obstruct, pervert, or defeat the course of justice, in that they:

(a) while conducting or instructing the conduct of proceedings before the courts of Canada — including in the matter of Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, SCC File No. 41859, which remains before the Supreme Court of Canada and is not concluded — have not disclosed, and continue not to disclose, to the court the pre-existing common law liberty of the natural person directly engaged by those proceedings, knowing or having constructive knowledge of its existence, in breach of the Crown's duty of candour to the court and of the Crown's obligation under s. 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms not to construe the Charter as denying the existence of other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada — the said failure of candour being ongoing at the date this Information is sworn;

(b) by reason of the said continuing failure to place the pre-existing liberty of the natural person before any court in proceedings touching the Firearms Act or its predecessor instruments, caused or permitted the absence of any limiting principle in the language of those instruments as against the Heir class — the Heirs, holding a pre-existing liberty never extinguished, ought to have been expressly carved out of the reach of those instruments — with the consequence that Bill C-21, S.C. 2023, c. 32, was drafted, certified under s. 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act as consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and enacted without any such limiting principle, thereby further encroaching upon the Heir class without constitutional authority and without the limiting recognition that candour before the courts would have required;

(c) construed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as denying the existence of other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada — including the pre-existing liberty of the natural person — in direct contravention of the mandatory interpretive direction at section 26 of the Charter, which is binding on the Attorneys General no less than on the courts;

contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

COUNT 4 — Disobeying a Statute

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 126(1)

That the accused, knowingly or having no lawful excuse, did contravene an Act of Parliament by wilfully doing an act that it forbids or by wilfully omitting to do an act that it requires to be done, in that they:

> (a) contravened section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which provides that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect — by enforcing, administering, and defending instruments that are inconsistent with the constitutional order and therefore of no force or effect;
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> (b) contravened section 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms — which provides that the guarantee in the Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada — by construing the Charter as the ceiling of rights protection and denying the existence of a pre-Confederation liberty;

contrary to section 126(1) of the Criminal Code.

COUNT 5 — Extortion

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 346(1)

When a pre-existing liberty is conditioned on payment under threat, the demand does not expire — it becomes continuous extortion.

That the accused, without reasonable justification or excuse, did induce or attempt to induce a person to do something by threats, in that they:

(a) by constructing and maintaining instruments that imposed criminal liability upon the informant and all natural persons holding the pre-existing common law liberty for the exercise of that liberty — thereby creating a standing threat of prosecution inhering in the instruments themselves — without constitutional jurisdiction to do so and without reasonable justification or excuse;

(b) by means of that standing threat, induced the informant to obtain and maintain a Possession and Acquisition Licence and to pay the fees associated therewith, the said compliance being procured by compulsion rather than free consent, the informant having no lawful alternative but to comply or face criminal prosecution for the exercise of a pre-existing liberty;

(c) the said standing threat further included the power of entry upon the home of the informant to inspect, seize, or confiscate arms held pursuant to the pre-existing liberty, under instruments that had no constitutional authority to reach that liberty — constituting a continuous threat to the security of the person and property of the informant in their home, contrary to the common law principle established in Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St Tr 1029, that no authority derived from a void instrument justifies entry upon the home;

(d) the standing threat was without reasonable justification or excuse, the instruments by which it was constructed being *void ab initio* as against the Heirs for want of constitutional authority to reach the pre-existing liberty, the particulars of which are set out above and are incorporated herein by reference;

the demand does not expire — it becomes continuous extortion, contrary to section 346(1) of the Criminal Code.

COUNT 6 — Participation in a Criminal Organization

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 467.1, 467.11

Count 5 describes what was done to one person. Count 6 describes the structure by which it was done to a class.

That the accused did knowingly participate in or contribute to the activity of a criminal organization for the purpose of enhancing the ability of that organization to facilitate or commit an indictable offence, in that they:

(a) as members of a group of three or more persons — comprising the Attorneys General of Canada, Ministers of Justice, Crown counsel, officers of the Canadian Firearms Program, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police acting in the administration and enforcement of the impugned instruments — acting in concert over a continuous period from not later than 1995 to the present day;

(b) for the purpose of facilitating and committing the serious offences of extortion contrary to section 346(1) of the Criminal Code and fraud contrary to section 380(1) of the Criminal Code — both being indictable offences carrying maximum terms of imprisonment of life and fourteen years respectively, and therefore "serious offences" within the meaning of section 467.1 — against the entire class of natural persons holding the pre-existing common law liberty to possess arms, being all natural-born subjects and citizens of Canada who have never surrendered that liberty;

(c) for the material benefit of the Crown, in that licence fees, renewal fees, registration costs, and compliance expenditures were extracted from the class of Heirs continuously and systematically under instruments that had no constitutional authority to reach them, the said extraction constituting unjust enrichment of the organization at the direct expense of the class;

(d) each accused named herein knowingly participated in the activity of the organization by holding, exercising, or instructing the exercise of the powers of the office of Attorney General of Canada in the administration, defence, and enforcement of instruments they knew, or ought to have known, had no constitutional authority to reach the Heirs;

contrary to section 467.11(1) of the Criminal Code.

PARTICULARS

1. The constitutionally protected liberty at issue is the liberty of the natural person — the Heir to Canada's constitutional order — to possess lawfully acquired property, including arms, without prior administrative authorization. This liberty predates Confederation, was received into constitutional protection by the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 (importing the principles and precedents of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, including Article 7 of the English Bill of Rights 1689), and is shielded by section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

2. The liberty was never extinguished by Parliament in clear and plain language, as required by the standard established in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075. No Act of Parliament from 1867 to the present contains an express, unambiguous declaration that the pre-Confederation liberty to possess arms is abolished, surrendered, or extinguished. The Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, and its predecessor instruments regulate; they do not extinguish. Regulation is not extinguishment. The distinction is constitutionally dispositive.

3. Section 26 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains a mandatory interpretive direction: "The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada." This provision is self-executing and directed at every person who reads and applies the Charter, including the Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Attorneys General, and every officer of the Crown. The liberty described herein is an "other right or freedom that exists in Canada" within the meaning of section 26.

4. The instruments by which the encroachment was effected include, without limitation: the Criminal Code amendments of 1892, 1913, 1920, 1934, 1951, 1968–69, 1977, and 1991; the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39; the Order in Council SOR/2020-96 of May 1, 2020; and Bill C-21, S.C. 2023, c. 32.

5. Each accused named herein held an office in which the duty to identify, recognize, and act upon constitutional deficiencies was inherent. Each had access to the same constitutional instruments. The informant believes on reasonable grounds, based on the public record, that each failed to discharge that duty.

6. On April 12, A.D. 2026, notices were sent by email to the office of the Attorney General of Canada, and commonlawcanada.ca was published and has been live since that date, placing the constitutional argument and the supporting record in the public domain. On April 13, A.D. 2026, a legal notice was published in the Ottawa Citizen (Order No. OTC013118, online April 13, print April 14), placing the current Attorney General of Canada and the public at large on further express notice of the constitutional deficiency. The public notice had been posted for not less than 48 hours before this Information was sworn. Upon receipt of the email notices of April 12, A.D. 2026, the standard of knowledge for the current holders of office shifted from constructive knowledge to actual knowledge. Despite receipt of the notices on April 12, public notice at commonlawcanada.ca running continuously from April 12, and the Ottawa Citizen notice from April 13, the Crown has not moved. No acknowledgment has been received. No correction has been made. No stay of the offending conduct has been issued. The continuation of the regime in the face of actual, documented, unrebutted notice is not inadvertence — it is wilful continuation. Every act taken in continuation of the encroachment after receipt of the notice is taken knowingly — *sciemment*.

7. The informant, Martin Lamothe, is a natural person and rightful Heir to Canada's constitutional order, holding a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) issued under the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39. The informant did not obtain the PAL freely. The PAL was obtained under direct legal compulsion: the alternative to obtaining and maintaining the licence was criminal prosecution for possession of lawfully acquired property held pursuant to a pre-existing constitutional liberty. The compliance was coerced. No free consent was given. The informant is a victim of the fraud described in Count 2 of this Information — having paid licence fees and renewal fees as a condition of exercising a liberty that no Parliament created and no Parliament had authority to condition. Those fees were extracted by deceit: the accused held out the licensing regime as constitutionally valid when it was, and remains, constitutionally void as against the Heirs. The informant has standing to swear this Information not only as a member of the public under s. 504 of the Criminal Code, but as a person directly injured by the offences alleged.

8. The Criminal Code attaches to the natural person, not to the office. No ministerial immunity, no administrative convention, and no claim of Crown prerogative shields the natural person from the operation of the criminal law (Criminal Code, s. 122; R. v. Boulanger, 2006 SCC 32). The persons named herein are accused in their personal capacity as natural persons who held, or hold, the offices described.

9. The following former holders of the office of Attorney General of Canada are deceased and are therefore not named as accused in this Information, but their tenures form part of the particulars establishing the systematic and incremental character of the encroachment: the Honourable Ron Basford (1975–1978, d. 2005); the Honourable Marc Lalonde (1978–1979, d. 2023); the Honourable Jacques Flynn (1979–1980, d. 2000); the Honourable Mark MacGuigan (1982–1984, d. 1998); and the Right Honourable Ray Hnatyshyn (1986–1988, d. 2002).

10. Standing. The informant holds a Possession and Acquisition Licence obtained under compulsion — the alternative being criminal prosecution for the exercise of a pre-existing liberty. Licence fees have been paid under that compulsion. The informant has been directly and personally subjected to the impugned regime and has suffered concrete injury as a consequence. Standing is established on the face of this Information and does not require further demonstration.

11. Foundation of the liberty. The pre-existing liberty at issue predates Confederation, predates the Constitution of Canada, and predates any statute purporting to regulate it. It exists by inheritance at common law, received into the constitutional order through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, which imports a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, including the principles and precedents of the English Bill of Rights 1689, Article 7. The liberty does not depend on any particular judicial decision for its existence. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, is noted as illustration of the principle that extinguishment of a pre-existing right requires clear and plain legislative language — but the liberty described herein does not derive from Sparrow and is not confined to the Aboriginal rights context in which that case arose. The principle is a structural feature of the common law constitutional order, not a creation of that decision.

12. Regulation is not extinguishment. Acts of Parliament operate within the constitutional order. They cannot reach what the constitutional order protects. The cumulative weight of regulatory instruments from 1892 to the present does not constitute extinguishment of the pre-existing liberty, however extensive that regulation may be. Regulation — however accumulated over time — remains regulation. It does not become extinguishment by accumulation. No Act of Parliament from 1867 to the present contains language that explicitly and unambiguously extinguishes the pre-existing common law liberty to possess lawfully acquired arms. That is a fact about the legislative record that any person may verify by reading the statutes.

12A. Parliament's own drafting practice confirms the boundary of the statutory reach. The Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(3), grants Parliament the power of "the raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation." That provision names no persons. It grants a power; it does not identify its subjects. The identification of subjects is left to the implementing statute — the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.). When Parliament enacted that statute, it defined "person" to *include* "any body corporate and politic, and the **heirs**, executors, administrators or other legal representatives of such person" (Ontario Income Tax Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.2; mirrored in the federal Act). The word *includes* is an extending term — not a defining term. It takes a category that exists independently of the statute and pulls it within the statute's reach for a specific purpose. The Heir existed before the Income Tax Act reached for them. The enumeration was necessary precisely because the Heir, as a pre-statutory common law category, would not otherwise have been captured.

The consequence for the Firearms Act is direct. Parliament demonstrated, in its own taxation statute, that bringing the Heir within a statutory regime requires explicit enumeration. The Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, contains no such enumeration. The Heir is nowhere named. The Act operates as though only administrative persons — statutory creatures — exist within its reach. The principle *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* — the expression of one thing excludes the other — applies with full force: where Parliament knows how to capture Heirs when it intends to, a statute that does not name them has not captured them. The Income Tax Act names the Heir. The Firearms Act does not. Parliament has not captured what it did not name. The boundary of the Firearms Act's reach stops at the door of the Heir's pre-existing liberty — not because the liberty is claimed by assertion, but because Parliament's own cross-statutory drafting practice confirms it.

12A(ii). The cross-statutory record confirmed. Particular 12A established the *expressio unius* argument from the Income Tax Act alone. The argument does not rest on a single statute. The use of "heirs" by Parliament across the full body of federal legislation is pervasive, consistent, and doctrinally uniform. In every instance, Parliament reached for the Heir by explicit enumeration — acknowledging a pre-existing common law category that would not be captured without being named. The *Firearms Act* names no heirs.

The cross-statutory record of Parliament's own drafting practice is set out below. Each instrument is a public record, verifiable by any person, self-authenticating under the *Canada Evidence Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, created by Parliament itself:

> ***Constitution Act, 1867*, Fifth Schedule — Oath of Allegiance.** The most constitutionally significant instance. The prescribed oath reads: "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King Charles the Third, His **Heirs** and Successors, according to law." Every accused named in this Information swore allegiance to the Heirs. The Heirs appear in the foundational constitutional instrument itself — as the subjects of the allegiance owed by Crown officers. The oath does not expire. There is no un-oath.
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> ***Oaths of Allegiance Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-1.** Parliament enacted a standalone statute to codify the oath of allegiance. The prescribed text names "Her Heirs and Successors" as the subjects of that allegiance. The Heirs appear in the operative text of the statute by Parliament's own hand.
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> ***Citizenship Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29.** Every person granted citizenship swears: "I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and Successors." Parliament encoded the Heirs into the citizenship oath by statute. Every citizen of Canada has sworn allegiance to the Heirs.
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> ***Escheats Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-13.** The Crown becomes entitled to property only where the person last seised died intestate and "without lawful heirs." Parliament defined the Crown's claim to *bona vacantia* as contingent on the complete absence of heirs. This is the clearest statutory statement of the hierarchy: the Heir's title is senior to the Crown's. Where the Heir exists, the Crown has no claim. The *Escheats Act* is Parliament's own acknowledgment that the Heir's title is the senior interest, and the Crown is the residual claimant — not the original grantor.
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> ***Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act*, R.S.C. 1991, c. F-8.4, s. 20.** A Crown grant issued to a deceased person is not void — title vests in "the heirs, assigns or successors, legatees or legatees by particular title, or other legal representatives of the deceased person." Parliament explicitly preserved the Heir's title to property as the primary transmission vehicle for Crown-granted land. The Heir receives the Crown grant by inheritance, not by fresh application. Title passes by lineage.
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> ***Patent Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2.** "Legal representatives" is defined to *include* "heirs, executors, administrators of the estate, liquidators of the succession, guardians, curators, tutors, transferees and all other persons claiming through applicants for patents." Same *includes* construction as the Income Tax Act — Parliament reaching into the pre-existing common law category by explicit enumeration. Without the enumeration, the Heir would not be captured.
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> ***Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s. 83.** Where a copyright work has not been published at the time of bankruptcy, it shall "revert and be delivered to the author or their heirs." Parliament recognised the Heir's title as the natural reversion point for property — senior to the claims of the bankruptcy estate, senior to creditors, senior to the trustee. The Heir's claim on property precedes the statutory insolvency regime.
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> ***Financial Administration Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11, s. 119.** The Treasury Board shall indemnify a Crown corporation director or officer "and the director's or officer's heirs and legal representatives" against costs and judgments. Parliament recognised heirs as the natural successors to the natural person's rights and obligations — extending the indemnity to them automatically without requirement of fresh application or qualification.

The doctrinal picture produced by this cross-statutory record is complete and admits of no ambiguity. Three conclusions follow directly from Parliament's own instruments, without inference or extrapolation:

First: the Heir is a recognised, pre-existing common law category that Parliament captures by explicit enumeration whenever it intends to bring that category within a statute's reach. The *includes* construction is the mechanism: the Heir is pulled in from outside the statute, not generated by it. The enumeration is necessary because the Heir exists independent of the statute.

Second: the *Escheats Act* establishes the hierarchy with constitutional precision: the Heir's title is senior to the Crown's. The Crown is the residual claimant, not the original grantor. Where the Heir exists, the Crown has no claim. Parliament said so.

Third: the *Firearms Act* names no heirs. Every other instrument reviewed above names them when Parliament intends to reach them. The *Firearms Act*'s silence is therefore not a drafting oversight. It is the outer boundary of the statute's constitutional reach. *Expressio unius est exclusio alterius*: Parliament has not captured what it did not name. The entire cross-statutory record of Parliament's own instruments confirms it.

12B. The Constitution does not permit Parliament to extinguish, license, or lease the pre-existing liberties of the Heir — and a power the Constitution does not grant, Parliament does not possess.

Section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, provides that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and that any law inconsistent with it is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. Parliament operates within the Constitution. It does not stand above it. It cannot reach by ordinary statute what the Constitution protects by inheritance. Three acts are constitutionally prohibited, and each is engaged by the impugned instruments:

First — Extinguishment. The pre-existing liberty entered the constitutional order at Confederation through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, importing a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, including the principles and precedents of the English Bill of Rights 1689, Article 7. What enters the constitutional order by that route can only leave it by constitutional amendment — not by ordinary statute. Parliament cannot extinguish by Act what the Constitution received by inheritance. The standard established in *R. v. Sparrow*, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, confirms that extinguishment of a pre-existing right requires clear and plain legislative language. No such language exists in any instrument from 1867 to the present. The liberty has not been extinguished. It remains.

Second — Licensing. A licence is permission granted by one who holds authority to permit. The Crown holds no title to the Heir's pre-existing liberty — it did not create it, did not grant it, and cannot revoke it. A regime that conditions the exercise of a pre-existing liberty on prior Crown permission has not regulated the liberty; it has inverted the constitutional order, converting the Crown into the grantor of what it never owned. *Magna Carta*, Chapter 29, states the principle that has governed the constitutional order since A.D. 1215: to no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice. The Crown may not sell what belongs to the Heir. The PAL fee is the sale of a right the Crown does not own.

Third — Leasing. The PAL renewal cycle does not redeem the liberty — it leases it back, term by term. A lease requires title in the lessor. The Crown has no title. What the Crown has constructed is a perpetual extraction from persons whose liberty it cannot reach — enforced by criminal sanction, renewed indefinitely, the demand never resolving. Each renewal is a fresh demand backed by the same threat. *Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit* — that which is void from the beginning does not become valid by the passage of time. The instruments had no constitutional authority to reach the Heirs from the moment of their enactment. No period of compliance, no accumulation of renewals, and no passage of time cures the foundational absence of jurisdiction.

The shackle on Parliament is not a malfunction of the constitutional order. It is its purpose. The Constitution was built precisely to restrain Parliamentary majorities — however large, however insistent — from

reaching what the constitutional order places beyond their grasp. The Heir's pre-existing liberty is one of those things. The Constitution does not contain a provision authorizing Parliament to extinguish a pre-existing common law liberty, to convert it into a licensed privilege, or to charge the Heir for its use. Search the Constitution for such a provision — it is not there. It was never there. Because the constitutional tradition that produced these instruments has always known that the sale of right is the negation of right, and that a constitution which permits the state to price pre-existing liberties has not protected them.

12C. Taxonomy of encroachment mechanisms. The doctrinal vice common to all mechanisms set out below is not the fee itself — it is the implicit premise that the grantor owns the thing being conditioned. The pattern is constant: a pre-existing right is taken as the substrate, and a fee-collection mechanism is draped over it as though the right were a licensed privilege. The governing maxim is *nemo dat quod non habet*: the State cannot charge rent on what it does not own. Where the right pre-exists the State's claim to administer it, the fee is not a regulation — it is an exaction without lawful authority. The following twelve mechanisms are identified, each present in the impugned regime to varying degrees:

> **1. Licence / Permit.** The State purports to convert an inherent liberty into a revocable permission. The PAL/RPAL is the paradigm: the right existed; the Heir must now pay and qualify to exercise what was always theirs.
>
> **2. Lease / Rent.** The State acts as landlord of something it never owned. The Heir pays ongoing rent for the exercise of a right older than the Crown's claim to administer it.
>
> **3. Rent-back.** A variation of the lease: the State acquires or purports to acquire the right by compulsory process, then offers it back on payment of a recurring fee. The Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program combined with re-licensing follows this structure precisely.
>
> **4. Toll.** A charge on passage or use of something that was never the tollkeeper's to grant. The PAL system has the characteristics of a toll on the exercise of a pre-existing liberty: no payment, no passage.
>
> **5. Tax on Exercise.** Framed as a revenue measure, but operative as a condition on the exercise of the right. A fee on the exercise of a pre-existing liberty is a tax on the right itself. As established in Particular 12B above, s. 91(3) of the Constitution Act, 1867, authorizes Parliament to tax; it does not authorize Parliament to make the exercise of a constitutional right contingent on payment. A tax on a constitutional right is not a valid exercise of the taxation power — it is constitutional subjugation dressed in fiscal clothing.
>
> **6. Registration / Filing Fee.** The right is not denied outright, but exercising it is made contingent on registration and payment. Firearms registration fees impose a cost on the assertion of a pre-existing entitlement — the Heir pays for the administrative record of what was already theirs.
>
> **7. Certification / Accreditation.** A competence or character test is interposed, with a fee attached. The real operation is the conversion of the right into a meritocratic grant: the State arrogates to itself the power to certify what the common law already presumed — the capacity of the natural person. The Firearms Safety Course requirement operates precisely in this manner.
>
> **8. Bond / Surety Requirement.** The right may be exercised, but only upon depositing financial security against potential future harm. The presumption of liberty is inverted: the Heir must prove by payment that they will not misuse what they already lawfully hold. This is a pre-crime financial penalty imposed on the exercise of a pre-existing right.
>
> **9. Insurance Mandate.** Compulsory third-party arrangements as a condition of exercise. The storage and transportation requirements of the Firearms Act operate in this manner: the Heir may hold the liberty, but only after complying with State-mandated conditions whose cost falls entirely on the Heir.

10. Escheat / Forfeiture on Non-Use. The right is deemed abandoned upon lapse of an administrative requirement, with the State claiming the residue. A lapsed PAL triggers forfeiture of lawfully held property. The State monetises the gap created by its own procedural architecture — a gap it designed, and which would not exist absent the impugned regime.

11. Inspection / Audit Fee. *Entick v. Carrington* (1765) territory. Access to the Heir's own property is made contingent on the State's inspection of it. The fee launders what is structurally a general warrant — it makes the intrusion appear consensual and commercial. The safe inspection regime under the Firearms Act operates in precisely this manner: entry upon the home under colour of a licensing condition, the constitutional prohibition of which was settled in 1765 and imported into Canada's constitutional order through the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867.

12. Renewal / Re-Qualification. The right does not expire — but the document purporting to evidence it does, and renewal requires payment and re-examination. A perpetual right is converted into a term right by administrative architecture, with a toll at each renewal gate. As established in Particular 14 above, the PAL renewal cycle does not redeem the liberty; it leases it back, term by term, the demand never resolving.

The PAL/RPAL regime engages all twelve mechanisms simultaneously: licence (1), lease (2), toll (4), tax on exercise (5), registration fee (6), certification (7), bond-equivalent safety course (8), storage mandate (9), forfeiture on non-renewal (10), inspection scheme (11), and perpetual renewal (12). That accumulation is itself an argument. No single legitimate regulatory purpose requires the full stack. A regime that deploys every known mechanism of encroachment against a single pre-existing liberty bears the characteristics of systematic suppression rather than regulation. The constitutional order does not permit it. The Constitution contains no provision that does.

13. No stay is warranted pending SCC File No. 41859. No stay is warranted pending Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, SCC File No. 41859. That proceeding addresses the Firearms Act on statutory and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms grounds. As of the date this Information is sworn, the pre-existing common law liberty of the natural person — grounded in the constitutional order and section 26 of the Charter — has not been placed before the Supreme Court of Canada in those proceedings. The Information does not purport to characterize what arguments may yet be advanced in that proceeding; it observes what the record discloses as at the date of swearing. A stay pending a proceeding that has not, as of this date, addressed the pre-existing liberty of the Heir class is not warranted and would serve only to further delay recognition of a liberty that has never been extinguished.

14. The character of Count 5 — extortion. A licence purports to grant permission. But permission can only be granted by one who holds the authority to permit. Where the liberty pre-exists the licensor, and was never surrendered, the licence is not permission — it is rent. The Crown, holding no title to the liberty of the Heirs, cannot licence it. What the Crown has done instead is lease back to the rightful owner what was never the Crown's to let — and charge for the term, on pain of prosecution.

The three elements of extortion under section 346(1) of the Criminal Code are satisfied as follows. First, the threat: the Firearms Act and the Criminal Code, taken together, impose criminal liability on any Heir who exercises the pre-existing liberty without a licence. That threat is not incidental to the instruments — it is their mechanism. It inheres in the instruments themselves and operates continuously against every Heir within their reach. Second, causation: the informant obtained and maintained a Possession and Acquisition Licence, and paid the fees associated therewith, because of that threat. No other reason existed. The compliance was compelled, not consented to. Third, absence of lawful excuse: the Crown had no constitutional authority to condition the liberty in the first place. A threat issued without jurisdiction is a naked threat. The absence of jurisdiction is not a technicality — it is the fact that transforms an administrative requirement into an extortionate demand.

The continuous character of the extortion follows from the structure of the PAL renewal cycle. A one-time payment that permanently restored the liberty would have a different character — the demand would expire upon compliance and the threat would resolve. That is not the regime in issue. The PAL does not redeem the liberty; it leases it back, term by term. Upon expiry of the licence, criminal liability reasserts itself automatically. The Heir must pay again, submit again, and comply again — or become a criminal again — indefinitely. The demand never resolves. It only defers. Each renewal is a fresh demand backed by the same threat. The extortion is therefore not a historical event that concluded upon the informant's initial compliance; it is a continuing offence, renewed with each licence cycle, for as long as the instruments remain in force.

The *void ab initio* consequence completes the analysis. Because the instruments had no constitutional authority to reach the Heirs from the moment of their enactment, no lawful demand was ever made. Every fee paid, every licence obtained, every renewal submitted, was extracted under a threat that had no legal foundation. The instruments do not become valid by operation of time or compliance. *Quod ab initio non valet in tractu temporis non convalescit* — that which is void from the beginning does not become valid by the passage of time. The entirety of the Crown's conduct under these instruments, from first enactment to present day, has the characteristics of a single continuous extortion of the class of persons the instruments purport to reach.

15. Material benefit — double extraction. The material benefit extracted from the Heir class by the apparatus described herein is established by the Crown's own published instruments and admits of no dispute. It operates on two levels. The first is direct: licence fees and compliance costs extracted from the Heir class as a condition of exercising a liberty already held, quantifiable from RCMP Fees Reports and Canada Gazette records as not less than $600 million in 2026 dollars since 1995, and on a full economic burden analysis in the range of $10 billion to $14 billion. The second is indirect: every member of the Heir class, as a Canadian taxpayer, has simultaneously funded the apparatus of extraction through general taxation — the Canadian Firearms Program, its enforcement infrastructure, its legal defence before the courts, and its successive expansions through SOR/2020-96 and Bill C-21, S.C. 2023, c. 32. Parliamentary records establish that from 2016 to 2023 alone, over $1.4 billion in public funds was directed to firearms-related spending (Public Safety Canada, Parliamentary Committee Notes, April 2025), with the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program alone crossing $548 million in budgeted expenditure from 2021 to fiscal 2025, approaching $803 million when RCMP operational costs are included (Main Estimates and Supplementary Estimates, as reported in Order Paper responses tabled by MP Larry Brock). The Heir class is thus subjected to a double extraction: compelled directly to pay for a licence to exercise a liberty already held, and compelled indirectly through taxation to fund the apparatus that enforces that compulsion against them. The conduct described, on this analysis, has the characteristics of a self-financing criminal enterprise — its victims fund both the demand and the enforcement.

The informant notes, by way of reservation, that the figures cited above encompass all PAL holders and do not distinguish between Heirs — natural-born persons holding the pre-existing liberty by inheritance — and persons whose presence in Canada is founded on *ligeantia acquisita* rather than *ligeantia naturalis*. The informant does not presently have access to the data necessary to isolate the Heir proportion of the class. The Court, however, would be in a position to determine this on the basis of lawful presence records and the distinction between natural-born and acquired citizenship, both of which are matters of public record within the jurisdiction of the Crown. The figures stated should therefore be understood as an upper bound on the extraction attributable to the Heir class, with the Heir-specific quantum to be determined by the Court on proper inquiry.

15A. The ASFCP communications as an apparent military-grade psychological operation deployed against unsuspecting Heirs under RCMP letterhead, and the question of undisclosed authorship. The financial architecture described in Particular 15 above operated upon a population that was not, in the main, legally advised about the constitutional position set out in this Information. The Crown's communications were not directed at informed legal adversaries. They were directed at natural persons — Heirs — who had

been systematically excluded from knowledge of their own pre-existing liberty by the same institutional apparatus that was now purporting to extinguish it. The mechanism by which that exclusion was maintained and exploited in the ASFCP notices is properly characterized, on its documented structural features, as an apparent military-grade psychological operation conducted against the civilian population of Heirs using Crown resources and infrastructure. The question of who designed that operation — and whether the institutional name on the communication accurately represents the author — is a matter this Information places squarely before the Court.

The evidentiary basis is the Crown's own language. The Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 11 provides that "shall" is imperative and "may" is permissive. Crown counsel and departmental legal advisors are trained in this distinction without exception. The ASFCP notices, produced through the full institutional review machinery of Public Safety Canada and the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program, transmitted in both official languages and cryptographically authenticated, are not the work of persons unfamiliar with the operative difference between "will" and "can." The word choice is deliberate. And in every threat-proximate position in both notices, the language retreats behind a hedge. The initial notice states that the penalties "can include prison sentences" — not "will include." The final reminder states that non-compliance "places you at risk of" criminal liability, that consequences are "potentially severe," and that the penalties "can include prison sentences" — verbatim from the first notice, confirming this is not variation but policy. Two bilingual notices, two months apart, the same hedged formula in the same threat-adjacent positions, produced through the same institutional chain: this is a drafting policy, not an accident. The inference available on the face of the documents is that the Crown's legal advisors knew that unqualified declarations of criminal consequence would be misrepresentations of the constitutional position — and chose instead words calibrated to produce the psychological effect of a threat while preserving deniability against the legal accountability of having issued one.

The structural features of the communications bear the complete structural signature of established military-grade psychological operations doctrine — a doctrine that, if applied here, would not be a civilian law enforcement capability. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a civilian police service. It is not a branch of the Canadian Armed Forces. It does not maintain, in its published mandate, the doctrine, training, or operational capacity to design and execute psychological operations of the kind described in this Particular. PSYOP doctrine — as formalized in Allied military doctrine from the First World War onward, developed through the Second World War, Korea, and Vietnam, and institutionalized in the modern era under the formal designation PSYOP — is, if that is what these notices represent, an apparent military-grade and defence intelligence capability. Its six structural elements are: (1) mass distribution to a defined target population through precision delivery infrastructure; (2) anonymous institutional authority with no named individual signatory accountable for the representations made; (3) binary framing that presents exactly two options and erases the perception of a third; (4) hedged modal language that implies consequences the issuer cannot guarantee, preserving psychological effect while avoiding misrepresentation liability; (5) a safe passage offer presented as generous and time-limited; and (6) a fixed deadline designed to force individual decision before the target population can organize a collective legal response or obtain independent legal advice. Every one of these six elements is present in the ASFCP notices without exception. The informant believes on reasonable grounds that the presence of this operational architecture in communications bearing RCMP letterhead raises a question that the investigation this Information initiates is required to answer: whether the design, drafting, or operational planning of these communications involved personnel or capabilities of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, or allied defence intelligence agencies, whose participation would have been concealed from every recipient behind the civilian institutional brand of the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program.

The targeting list is the PAL database. Every holder of a valid PAL received these notices — a defined population, identified through confidential licensing records held by the state, reached simultaneously through authenticated Crown infrastructure. This is not a public notice posted in a gazette; it is precision-targeted mass communication to a population the Crown had already catalogued by name. The anonymous

institutional sender — the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program, on behalf of Public Safety Canada — bears no individual signatory, no Law Society number, no named author, and no address for service of a reply. No natural person stands behind the communication in their individual capacity. The Crown hides behind the institution, the institution behind the program, the program behind the legislation: at no point in that chain does any identifiable person say "I am responsible for this communication and I can be held to account for it." The binary framing presents compliance or criminal liability; the option of constitutional challenge and principled refusal does not appear anywhere in either notice. It has been erased from the frame. The compensation program is the safe passage corridor. The declaration period of January 19 to March 31, 2026 — seventy-one days — is the deadline pressure mechanism: not generous time for an Heir to obtain independent constitutional legal advice about property held for decades before making an irreversible decision.

The RCMP letterhead is not a neutral detail. It is, on the authorship question raised above, potentially a veil. A recipient of a communication issued in the name of the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program is entitled to understand that the communication originates with the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program. That entitlement is not merely an expectation — it is the foundation of the communication's legal authority. A demand letter derives its legal force from the identity and authority of its author. If the operational architecture, drafting, or strategic design of the ASFCP notices was contributed to, in whole or in part, by personnel of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Communications Security Establishment, or any allied defence intelligence agency acting in a domestic targeting capacity, then the institutional name on the communication misrepresents the nature and source of the demand to every Heir who received it. Every Heir who complied in response to what they understood to be a civilian law enforcement communication, when that communication was in fact designed using what appears to be military-grade doctrine by authors concealed behind RCMP branding, was misled as to the fundamental character of what they were responding to. That misrepresentation is not a footnote to the extortion analysis — it is an aggravating dimension of it. Section 380(1) of the Criminal Code does not require that the fraudulent means be elaborate. It requires that they be fraudulent. Representing what appears to be a military-doctrine communication as a civilian law enforcement notice to obtain compliance from an unsuspecting recipient has the characteristics of the deceit alleged in Count 2. The informant notes this as a matter requiring investigation and places it before the Court accordingly: the question of who actually designed these communications, and whether RCMP letterhead was used to conceal that authorship from the Heirs who were its targets, has not been answered by the Crown. The absence of a named author — preserved by design through the anonymous institutional sender structure — ensures it cannot be answered without compelled disclosure.

The compensation offer does not survive scrutiny even on its own terms. The Crown's own notice states: "Submitting a declaration does not guarantee you will receive compensation." The criminal obligation to comply is absolute and admits no exception. The deadline is fixed and non-negotiable. But the Crown's reciprocal obligation to pay is explicitly contingent — conditional on fund availability, prioritized on a first-come-first-served basis, and subject to the appropriation decisions of the same government that created the obligation. An Heir who complies fully may receive nothing. An Heir who files late receives nothing, but faces identical criminal jeopardy. The obligation runs entirely one direction: unconditional compliance by the Heir; conditional payment by the Crown. That asymmetry is not consistent with any recognized principle of lawful expropriation. A genuine compensation regime identifies property, assesses its value, and pays that value as a right — not as a prize to the swift. Moreover, every dollar disbursed under the ASFCP comes from public revenue, to which the Heirs themselves contribute through taxation. The Crown does not compensate the Heir from independent Crown resources. It returns a fraction of the Heir's own contributed wealth as the price of a compelled transaction. That is not compensation in any constitutionally recognized sense. It has the characteristics of circular expropriation: the Heir funds both the demand and the payment, while bearing the entire risk that the payment will not arrive at all.

The strategic objective of the operation is the suppression of organized constitutional resistance before the underlying legal question is forced to a definitive answer. The purpose of a PSYOP leaflet campaign is not universal compliance. It is sufficient compliance — to reduce the non-compliant population to a size the authority can manage individually, without ever having to test the full force of the threatened consequences against an organized, informed, and legally represented opposition. If a sufficient proportion of PAL holders surrender their property before October 30, 2026, the Crown will have achieved the operational objective without ever confronting a fully defended constitutional challenge. The Heirs who comply are gone from the field. Those who remain can be addressed individually, in circumstances where collective legal resistance has been atomized by the compliance the leaflet was designed to produce. That is the structure. The ASFCP notices are not legal instruments seeking lawful compliance with a constitutionally valid prohibition. They are a behavioural intervention — anonymous, hedged, deadline-driven, binary-framed, and potentially authored by persons whose identity was concealed behind RCMP letterhead from every Heir who received them — designed to produce mass voluntary surrender of private property from persons who were never informed that they held a pre-existing constitutional liberty in that property, before the constitutional question was ever forced to a definitive answer. The anonymous authorship, the hedged language, the contingent compensation, the circular financing, the deadline pressure, and the undisclosed authorship question all serve that single strategic objective. The *nemo dat* principle completes the analysis: the Crown cannot purchase what it had no lawful authority to demand. Attaching a contingent, circular, and unguaranteed payment to an unlawful demand does not create the authority that was absent. It launders the demand in the language of commerce while leaving its constitutional deficiency intact. These notices are adduced as evidence of the operation, of the knowledge of the actors who designed and transmitted them, of the deliberate targeting of the Heir class as the subject population of an apparent military-grade psychological operation conducted against Canada's own natural persons, and of the question — which this Information places before the Court as a matter requiring investigation and compelled disclosure — of whether Department of National Defence or allied defence intelligence personnel or capabilities were involved in the design of that operation, sheltered from accountability by the civilian institutional name placed at the top of a communication that no Heir had any reason to believe was anything other than what it appeared to be.

15A(i). The chain of institutional command and the repurposing of a confidential statutory database. The ASFCP notices did not originate spontaneously. Two bilingual communications — cryptographically authenticated, formatted in HTML, bearing RCMP branding, transmitted through Amazon SES to a list drawn from the Canadian Firearms Program licensing database — each required the completion of an identifiable and sequential chain of institutional decisions before a single message reached a single inbox. That chain, on any reasonable reconstruction of how a nationally distributed government communication of this character is produced, comprised at minimum the following stages: (1) a decision was made to draft the communication — a decision that required authorization at a level of institutional seniority sufficient to direct the deployment of RCMP Canadian Firearms Program resources on behalf of Public Safety Canada; (2) the draft was prepared, in both official languages, by persons with knowledge of statutory drafting conventions, including the imperative/permissive distinction under the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 11 — the same persons who, as the text demonstrates, chose "can" and "potentially" and "at risk of" in every threat-proximate position; (3) the draft was reviewed by legal counsel — on the institutional record of a communication bearing criminal consequence language and transmitted under the authority of the Attorney General's mandate, the involvement of the Department of Justice and in all likelihood the office of the Attorney General of Canada is not a speculative inference but the ordinary operation of Crown legal review for communications of this type and consequence; (4) revisions were applied, including, on the evidence of the consistent hedging across both notices, revisions that replaced or confirmed unqualified declarations of criminal consequence with hedged modal language — revisions that could only have been made by persons who understood precisely why the unqualified language could not stand; (5) the communication was formatted into HTML for transmission through the Crown's contracted email delivery infrastructure (Amazon SES, ca-central-1 region), a technical step requiring the participation of information

technology personnel within or contracted to the Canadian Firearms Program; and (6) the order was given to transmit — a final authorization step, given by a person with authority over the Canadian Firearms Program's communications operations, directing that the formatted and legally reviewed communication be deployed to the full population of PAL holders identified in the licensing database.

Each of those six stages required a human decision and a human actor. The anonymous institutional sender conceals all of them. But the concealment does not dissolve the chain. It merely defers identification of the individuals who occupied each position in it to the stage of investigation and disclosure that this Information is designed to compel. The same individual or individuals who authored Piece 1 in January 2026 authored Piece 2 in March 2026 — the hedging formula is verbatim, the structure is identical, the bilingual construction is parallel. A single authorial hand, or a single institutional template with a single legal review, produced both communications. That single authorial chain connects directly to the decision-makers who authorized both the initial transmission and the follow-on "final reminder" — a deliberate escalation of communicative pressure issued one week before the declaration deadline, under the same institutional name, bearing the same hedged threat, directed at the same population. Whoever authorized the first notice authorized the second. Whoever reviewed the first notice reviewed the second. The decision to escalate — to transmit a second communication characterized as a "final reminder" — is a separate authorization event, subsequent to and informed by the first, and is itself evidence of continuing institutional intent.

The database question is distinct and engages a separate dimension of constitutional concern. The email addresses to which these notices were transmitted were not collected from PAL holders for the purpose of receiving coercive compliance communications. They were collected under the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, as a condition of licensing — a statutory requirement that the holder maintain current contact information with the Canadian Firearms Program for the administrative purposes of that Act: licence renewal, notification of regulatory changes, and related administrative functions. No PAL holder provided their email address in the knowledge or expectation that it would be used as the delivery vector for a communication designed to produce a psychological condition of compliance-through-fear in respect of the surrender of private property. The PAL email database is a confidential statutory registry. Its use as a targeting list for a behavioural intervention campaign — one bearing, as established above, the complete structural signature of military-grade psychological operations doctrine — is a repurposing of that database beyond the statutory authority under which it was assembled. The persons whose addresses appear in that database did not consent to that use. They had no mechanism by which to anticipate it, object to it, or opt out of it. The Crown used a confidential list assembled through statutory compulsion as the delivery infrastructure for a PSYOP. That use was authorized by the same chain of institutional decision-makers identified above, and was known by them to be the mechanism by which the communications would reach every PAL holder in Canada simultaneously — precisely the mass targeting feature that distinguishes a PSYOP leaflet drop from an ordinary administrative communication. The persons named in this Information, who held or hold the offices through which that authorization chain ran, are accountable in their personal capacities as natural persons who gave, or permitted, or failed to prevent, each step in that chain.

16. Parliament cannot redefine "Heir" to mean something it is not.

The argument that Parliament might simply redefine "Heir" by ordinary statute — assigning the word a new, restricted, or administrative meaning that excludes the natural person holding the pre-existing common law liberty — fails on structural grounds that are independent of any particular statutory text. The failure is not a matter of construction or interpretation. It is a matter of constitutional architecture.

"Heir" in the constitutional order is not a statutory term that Parliament coined. It is a term of art with a fixed, received meaning inherited from the common law and from the constitutional tradition at Confederation. Its meaning was settled before Parliament existed as a Canadian institution. The term traces through the common law of England — through *Calvin's Case* (1608), through Blackstone's *Commentaries*, through the English Bill of Rights 1689, through the pre-Confederation common law of

Upper Canada — all of which Parliament received at Confederation, not created. Parliament received the term; it did not originate it.

The constitutional significance of this is precise. The preamble to the *Constitution Act, 1867* declares a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. The Fifth Schedule of that Act prescribes an oath to the King's "Heirs and Successors according to law." That phrase has a fixed common law meaning: the natural successors by lineage to the constitutional order, in whom the liberties of that order inhere by birth. Parliament cannot alter the meaning of that term by ordinary statute any more than it can alter the meaning of "Crown," "Parliament," or "the Queen" by ordinary Act. These are constitutional terms. Their meaning is upstream of Parliament. Parliament receives them; it does not define them.

Even if Parliament were to attempt a statutory redefinition — say, by enacting an interpretation provision that assigned "heir" a narrow administrative meaning, or that purported to restrict the category to estate beneficiaries only — that redefinition would operate as an island. It would be operative only within the four corners of the statute containing it. It could not reach back and alter the constitutional meaning of the term as it appears in the Fifth Schedule oath, in the *Escheats Act*, in the *Federal Real Property Act*, in the *Oaths of Allegiance Act*, or in the pre-Confederation common law tradition from which every one of these instruments drew their meaning. Each of those instruments uses the term in its received common law sense. A statutory redefinition in one ordinary Act cannot overwrite the constitutional substrate.

The governing maxim here is *generalia specialibus non derogant* — a general provision does not derogate from a special one. The constitutional meaning of "Heir" — received from the common law, entrenched in the constitutional instruments, senior to any ordinary legislation — is the special, entrenched sense. A statutory redefinition in an ordinary Act is the general, legislative sense. Under the canonical rule of construction, the special prevails. The constitutional meaning of the Heir cannot be displaced by ordinary legislative interpretation clauses.

There is a further, deeper reason why this attempt would fail. The Heir's constitutional identity does not derive from the word "heir." It derives from the fact of birth within the constitutional order — from *ligeantia naturalis*. That fact is not word-dependent. Parliament cannot extinguish the constitutional status of the natural-born person by the device of redefining the label. The status precedes the label. Even if Parliament were to replace the word "heir" entirely with a new term — say, "constitutional beneficiary" — the underlying category would remain: the natural person born within the constitutional order, holding its liberties by inheritance, owing allegiance to the Crown, and owed in return the Crown's protection of those liberties. Removing the label does not dissolve the category. *Nemo dat quod non habet*: Parliament cannot give itself, by the device of redefinition, authority over a constitutional category it did not create and does not own. The attempt to redefine the label would be the constitutional equivalent of attempting to extinguish the right by silence — and it would fail for the same reason: the category exists independent of the instrument Parliament drafts.

17. Crown Copyright cannot alter the meaning of "Heir" within the constitutional tradition.

A related argument might be advanced: that the Crown, as author or publisher of the instruments in which "Heir" appears, holds copyright over those instruments under s. 12 of the *Copyright Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and that this copyright confers some proprietary authority over the meaning or use of the term within those instruments. The argument is attractive on its surface but collapses under examination on at least three independent grounds, each fatal standing alone.

First — copyright governs reproduction, not meaning. The *Copyright Act* vests copyright in the Crown for works prepared or published under Crown direction. That copyright is a property right in the expression of the work — its particular arrangement of words, its formatting, its typographic choices, its literary structure. It governs who may reproduce the instrument and in what form. It does not govern what the instrument means. The meaning of a legal instrument is a matter of constitutional and statutory interpretation, not intellectual property. Courts interpret legal instruments. They do not ask the Crown's

permission to construe its enactments, nor do they defer to the Crown's preferred interpretation as a matter of copyright ownership. The Crown cannot use s. 12 of the *Copyright Act* to lock in a favourable interpretation of its own instruments any more than a private party can use copyright to prevent courts from construing their contracts. Copyright is not an interpretive monopoly. The separation of these two domains — the property right in expression and the public right of interpretation — is foundational to the rule of law.

Second — the tradition is not Crown-authored. The common law meaning of "heir" predates any instrument over which the Canadian Crown could claim authorship. The term flows from the Proto-Indo-European root meaning "that which one leaves behind," through Latin *heres*, through Old French *heir*, into the common law of England. It was carried in *Magna Carta* (1215), through *Calvin's Case* (1608), through the English Bill of Rights (1689), through Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (1765–1769), and into the pre-Confederation common law of Upper Canada and British North America. Copyright attaches to original works of authorship. It does not attach to inherited tradition, received doctrine, or the accumulated common law. The Crown did not write *Magna Carta*. The Crown did not write *Calvin's Case*. The Crown did not write the English Bill of Rights. Those are the foundational sources of the Heir's constitutional meaning. They are not Crown copyright works. The tradition from which "heir" draws its constitutional force belongs to no one and to everyone — it is the common inheritance of the constitutional order, held in trust for all by the very institution that now attempts to weaponise a proprietary claim against it.

Third — constitutional terms cannot be monopolised. Even if the Crown held copyright over every Canadian instrument that uses the word "heir" — the *Constitution Act*, the *Escheats Act*, the *Oaths of Allegiance Act*, the *Income Tax Act*, and all the rest — copyright would not prevent this Information, any court, any subject, or any person within the constitutional order from using the word in its established constitutional sense. Copyright does not create a monopoly on meaning. It creates a monopoly on reproduction of the particular expression in which that meaning is clothed. The distinction is absolute and foundational. A person who reads the *Escheats Act* and understands that the Crown's claim arises only in the absence of heirs does not thereby infringe Crown copyright. They are reading and understanding — acts that copyright law does not govern, has never governed, and cannot govern without destroying the public accessibility of law upon which the entire constitutional order depends. *Ignorantia juris non excusat* — ignorance of the law is no excuse — presupposes that the law is accessible for reading, understanding, and acting upon. The Crown cannot simultaneously invoke that maxim against the Heir and claim a copyright-based monopoly over the law's meaning. The two positions are irreconcilable.

There is a final and comprehensive answer to the copyright argument, and it flows from the *Entick v. Carrington* principle: the Crown can only do what the law expressly authorises. The *Copyright Act* does not authorise the Crown to use copyright as an instrument of constitutional interpretation, or as a means of extending its administrative authority over a category of persons the constitutional order places beyond its reach. Copyright is a property statute. It governs economic rights in expressive works. It is not a constitutional instrument, and it cannot be deployed as one. The attempt to use Crown copyright to expand the Crown's authority over the Heir would be precisely the kind of action the constitutional order prohibits: the use of an administrative instrument to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. That the instrument in question is intellectual property rather than a general warrant does not change the structure of the prohibition. The principle is the same: authority must be grounded in law, and the law does not grant this authority.

18. Heirs who do not know they are Heirs: lawful excuse, or Crown obligation?

The most far-reaching question raised by the constitutional architecture set out in this Information concerns persons who are Heirs — who hold the pre-existing common law liberty by birth within the constitutional order, by *ligeantia naturalis* — but who have never been informed of that status. They obtained PALs. They paid licence fees. They complied with every requirement of the impugned regime. They did so not because they consented to submit their pre-existing liberty to administrative conditioning, but because the entire

apparatus of the state — law enforcement, licensing authorities, legal advisors, public communications — operated on the uniform premise that no such liberty existed, that the licence was constitutionally required, and that the alternative was criminal prosecution. They were never told there was a choice. No carve-out was offered. No acknowledgment was made. The liberty was never disclosed. Every Heir who holds a PAL today holds it under the same induced false premise: that the alternative is being made a criminal for exercising what was always theirs.

The question that arises is two-sided and both sides point against the Crown. The first is whether the Heir's ignorance of their own status provides a lawful excuse for compliance — in the sense that the compliance was not freely given and cannot be treated as voluntary submission to the regime. The second, and more powerful, is whether the Crown bore an obligation to ascertain who it was dealing with before administering a regime that extracted fees and threatened criminal prosecution from persons whose constitutional status it could not, on the law as stated in its own instruments, assume away.

On the lawful excuse question: Section 19 of the *Criminal Code* provides that ignorance of the law is no excuse — *ignorantia juris non excusat*. That maxim is directed at the subject. But the question here is materially different from ignorance of the law. The Heir's law — the pre-existing common law liberty, the constitutional inheritance, the fact of *ligeantia naturalis* — was not concealed through the Heir's own inattention or failure to inquire. It was actively and systematically suppressed by the administrative order through which the Crown administered the very regime now in question. The Crown constructed and maintained an apparatus premised on the non-existence of the Heir's liberty. It did not merely fail to advertise that liberty. It built an entire system of legal compulsion that treated the liberty as non-existent, and through that system induced every person within the Heir class to comply as though the liberty had never existed. The question is not whether the Heir knew the law — it is whether the Heir was in a position to know the truth about their own constitutional status in circumstances where every arm of the state was administering a fiction to the contrary. That is not ignorance of law in the sense s. 19 contemplates. That is induced error of status, produced and maintained by the party that had the most complete knowledge of the constitutional record and the greatest obligation to act on it.

The compliance of Heirs who did not know they were Heirs was not free consent to the licensing regime. It was performance obtained under a false premise — specifically, the premise that the licence was constitutionally required. That is a defect in the foundation of the consent, not merely a matter of legal ignorance. A contract obtained by misrepresentation of a foundational fact does not bind the party who was misled. The constitutional equivalent applies with at least equal force: compliance induced by the sustained, systematic misrepresentation that no liberty existed is not waiver of the liberty. *Non videntur qui errant consentire* — those who are in error do not appear to consent. The Heir who complied while labouring under the Crown-administered fiction that no liberty existed did not waive the liberty by complying. There was no informed consent to waive. Waiver requires knowledge of the right being surrendered. The Crown ensured that knowledge was never available to the Heir class, and it did so not by accident but by constructing and maintaining a licensing regime that proceeded as though the Heir's liberty was a nullity.

On the Crown's obligation to ascertain who it is dealing with: This is the more powerful ground, and it reverses the burden entirely. The Crown is not a private actor. The Crown is the institution that the constitutional order vests with the responsibility of protecting the pre-existing liberties of the Heirs. That protection is the reciprocal obligation owed in exchange for the allegiance that the Heirs, upon birth, owe to the Crown. The constitutional relationship is not unilateral. It is a bilateral obligation of the most fundamental kind: allegiance in exchange for protection. The common law doctrine established in *Calvin's Case* (1608) makes this reciprocity explicit: the subject owes the sovereign natural allegiance; the sovereign owes the subject natural protection. Without the Crown's protection of the Heir's liberties, the allegiance of the Heir has no lawful foundation — for allegiance cannot be owed to an institution that actively extinguishes what it was constituted to protect.

From this bilateral constitutional relationship, two positive obligations flow that are directly engaged by the impugned regime.

> **The duty of identification.** Before the Crown administers any scheme that extracts compliance, fees, or submission from persons, it is obligated to know the constitutional character of the relationship in which it stands to those persons. This is not an onerous obligation. The Crown's own instruments — the oath, the *Escheats Act*, the *Citizenship Act* — already contain the distinction between Heirs and others. The Crown knows the difference between *ligeantia naturalis* and *ligeantia acquisita*. The birth records, the citizenship records, the naturalization records, the registration of persons — all of these are within the jurisdiction and possession of the Crown. The Crown could, on proper inquiry, identify every natural-born Heir within the class of PAL holders. Its failure to do so before administering a regime that extracted fees and threatened prosecution from that class is not administrative oversight. It is the failure of an obligation that the constitutional relationship itself imposed. The Crown cannot say that it did not know who the Heirs were, when the records that would identify them are in the Crown's own custody and were never consulted for the purpose of determining constitutional jurisdiction over the persons being administered. The failure to inquire, in these circumstances, is not neutral. It is wilful blindness.
>
> **The duty not to induce performance contrary to the Heir's constitutional interests.** A Crown that owes the Heir protection of pre-existing liberties is under a positive obligation not to induce the Heir to perform acts that are contrary to those liberties. Paying a licence fee for something that requires no licence is contrary to the Heir's constitutional interests. Submitting to administrative approval for the exercise of a pre-existing liberty is contrary to the Heir's constitutional interests. Renewing that submission indefinitely, under threat of criminal prosecution, is contrary to the Heir's constitutional interests. Surrendering lawfully held property under a compensation program founded on instruments that are void as against the Heir class is contrary to the Heir's constitutional interests. In every instance, the Crown not only failed to protect those interests — it actively constructed the mechanism by which the Heir was induced to act against them. That is not merely a failure of protection. It is a positive breach of the bilateral constitutional obligation. The Crown cannot hold the benefit of allegiance on one side and deny the obligation of protection on the other. The bilateral relationship does not permit selective performance.

The consequence is direct and follows from the structure of the constitutional relationship without any need for external authority. The Crown cannot say to the Heir: "you should have known you were an Heir and asserted your liberty." The Crown constructed and maintained an administrative apparatus premised on the non-existence of that liberty. It never carved out the Heir class in any licensing instrument. It never offered an exemption or a reservation. It never acknowledged the pre-existing right in any public communication administered through the Canadian Firearms Program. It extracted universal compliance and built that compliance into the actuarial foundation of the entire licensing system. Having induced that compliance through a sustained, systematic operation of the full coercive apparatus of the state, the Crown bears the entire burden of that inducement. The Heir's ignorance of their status is not an independent fact — it is the direct product of the Crown's failure to identify who it was dealing with and to administer accordingly. The Crown cannot now invoke the Heir's ignorance as a shield against the consequences of its own breach.

The further consequence touches the ongoing criminal liability of the accused. Each person named in this Information was, or is, an officer of the Crown. Each had access to the constitutional record. Each swore an oath to protect the liberties of the Crown's subjects. Each administered, defended, or enforced instruments that extracted compliance from the Heir class without first ascertaining whether the instruments had constitutional jurisdiction over that class. The failure to ascertain was not inadvertence in all cases — and it ceased to be available as a defence at all upon receipt of the notices of April 12–14, A.D. 2026, which placed the constitutional argument, the cross-statutory record, and the Heir's pre-existing liberty before the current holders of office in documented, unrebutted form. Every act taken after receipt of those notices — every

continuation of the regime, every refusal to carve out the Heir class, every licence renewal demanded, every criminal prosecution advanced under the impugned instruments against a natural-born Heir — is taken with actual knowledge that the persons being administered are outside the constitutional reach of the instruments being administered against them.

The three questions addressed in Particulars 16, 17, and 18 are, at their foundation, one question: can the Crown use the administrative apparatus of the state — whether through statutory redefinition, copyright claim, or the simple failure to inform — to insulate itself from the constitutional consequences of administering a regime that has no constitutional authority over the persons it reaches? The answer, in each case, is no. The constitutional order does not permit the Crown to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. It cannot extinguish the Heir's liberty by statute. It cannot monopolise the meaning of "Heir" by copyright. And it cannot obtain the benefits of the Heir's constitutional status — the allegiance, the fee payments, the compliance, the surrender of property — while simultaneously failing to discharge the obligations that constitutional status imposes on the Crown in return. The Crown cannot hold the benefit and disclaim the burden. That is the whole of the constitutional order in a single proposition, and the whole of what this Information puts before the Court.

EVIDENCE

The informant respectfully advises the justice that the entirety of the evidence supporting this Information is drawn from the public record. No discovery is required. No private or confidential materials are relied upon. The evidence is self-authenticating and consists of instruments created, published, and maintained by the Crown and the Parliament of Canada.

The evidence includes, without limitation:

(a) The Constitution Act, 1867, including the preamble;

(b) The Constitution Act, 1982, including sections 26 and 52(1);

(c) The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;

(d) The English Bill of Rights 1689, Article 7;

(e) The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and all predecessor Criminal Code amendments from 1892 to present;

(f) The Firearms Act, S.C. 1995, c. 39, and all regulations made thereunder;

(g) The Order in Council SOR/2020-96, published in the Canada Gazette, May 1, 2020;

(h) Bill C-21, S.C. 2023, c. 32, and all Parliamentary records relating to its passage, including Hansard, committee transcripts, and the Charter Statement tabled under s. 4.1 of the Department of Justice Act;

(i) The Canada Gazette, including all Orders in Council, regulations, and directives relating to the firearms regime;

(j) The published records of the Canadian Firearms Program, including licence fee schedules, registration records, and annual Commissioner of Firearms Reports;

(k) The Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program records, including the declaration period data and compensation schedules published by Public Safety Canada;

(l) The legal notice published in the Ottawa Citizen on April 13–14, 2026 (Order No. OTC013118) and the notice published at commonlawcanada.ca on April 12, A.D. 2026, live and accessible since that date;

(m) The oaths of office sworn by each accused upon assuming the office described;

(n) The public record of the Supreme Court of Canada in the matter of Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights et al. v. Attorney General of Canada, SCC File No. 41859;

(o) R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 SCR 295; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72; Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 St Tr 1029; Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co Rep 1a; and all other authorities cited in the particulars and in the notice of April 12–14, A.D. 2026.

(p) Two cryptographically authenticated electronic communications from the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program, transmitted on behalf of Public Safety Canada via notification.canada.ca and the Crown's Amazon SES delivery infrastructure, addressed to the informant as a PAL holder, and constituting direct Crown communications demanding compliance with the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program under threat of criminal prosecution and licence revocation. These communications are preserved as Schedule 1 to this Information, with full DKIM authentication metadata, DMARC pass records, and SPF verification intact, so that any party may independently verify their authenticity. They are adduced as primary evidence of the threat element in Count 5 (Extortion) and of the continuing Crown conduct alleged in Counts 1, 2, and 6.

Every document listed above is a public record, published by the Crown or by Parliament, accessible without restriction, and self-authenticating under the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. The informant is not the author of the evidence. The informant is the person who read the public record and swore this Information on the basis of what the record discloses. The record documents, in the instruments of the Crown itself, the basis for the informant's belief. The informant believes on reasonable grounds that the acts enumerated herein were committed knowingly, or without lawful excuse, by natural persons who had access to the same public record and who were bound by oath to uphold the constitutional order it describes.

The evidence in item (p) above is of a different character from the statutory record in items (a) through (o). It is not a public record published by Parliament. It is a direct communication from the Crown to the informant, transmitted by the Crown's own electronic infrastructure, preserved forensically with its cryptographic authentication chain intact. It is self-authenticating under the Canada Evidence Act not through parliamentary publication but through the Crown's own DKIM signatures, which bind the message content to the Crown's domain (notification.canada.ca) by a mathematical relationship that any party may verify. The Crown cannot deny authorship of these communications. They constitute the clearest possible evidence of the threat element in Count 5: the Crown, in writing, under its own seal, demanded compliance and threatened criminal prosecution of the informant for possession of property held under a pre-existing constitutional liberty. The communications are set out in full in Schedule 1 to this Information.

SCIENTER

Ignorantia juris non excusat. The law is not hidden. The constitutional instruments are published and accessible. Every accused named herein had access to the Constitution Act, 1867, the Constitution Act, 1982, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Criminal Code, and the common law of Canada. Each was bound by oath to uphold the Constitution. The informant believes on reasonable grounds that each failed to do so. The maxim applies to the state with the same force it applies to the subject (Criminal Code, s. 19).

Upon receipt of the notices of April 12–14, A.D. 2026, the current holders of office possess actual knowledge. Every act taken hereafter in continuation of the encroachment is taken knowingly. Justice delayed is justice denied, and knowledge — once acquired — is an instantaneous attachment. There is no grace period.

Qui tacet consentire videtur — he who is silent is seen to consent. Fifty years of institutional silence in the face of a documented pattern is not the absence of a position; it is the position. Each failure to correct, each failure to inquire, each renewal of the same directional conduct without accounting for what preceded it, compounds the record rather than closing it.

The pattern does not require a confession. It requires an answer. And an answer requires engaging the timeline, the actors, the decisions, and the consistency of their direction — not dismissing the inquiry with the word coincidence, which is no answer at all, but the surrender of reason dressed as scepticism.

Veritas nihil veretur nisi abscondi — truth fears nothing but concealment. What has been concealed here is not a secret. It is a record. It was concealed in plain sight, in the ordinary operation of institutions that relied on the assumption that no one would look at fifty years as a single continuous thing. That assumption no longer holds.

The reader is not asked to conclude. The reader is asked to look.

The Crown's own drafting practice in the ASFCP notices is itself evidence of knowledge. The Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 11 requires that "shall" be read as imperative and "may" as permissive. Every Crown counsel and departmental legal advisor trained in statutory drafting knows this without exception. The notices at Schedule 1 were produced through the full institutional review chain of Public Safety Canada and the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program, in both official languages, cryptographically authenticated and transmitted to every PAL holder in Canada. They did not use "will" or "shall" in any threat-proximate position. They used "can," "potentially," and "at risk of." Two notices, two months apart, the same hedged formula in the same positions. That is not carelessness. It is the documented record of an institution that knew the constitutional ground was contested, and chose language calibrated to produce the psychological effect of a threat while preserving deniability against the legal accountability of having issued one. That knowledge is compounded by the operational architecture of the notices themselves: the RCMP is a civilian police service; PSYOP doctrine is, where it applies, a military-grade capability; and the presence of that doctrine's apparent complete structural signature in a communication bearing RCMP letterhead raises a question about authorship that the anonymous sender design was built to prevent anyone from asking. The accused named herein — or those among them who bear responsibility for the design, approval, and transmission of those communications — cannot claim ignorance of what the words they chose were engineered to accomplish, nor can they claim ignorance of who designed the operation those words were embedded in. The drafting is the confession. The letterhead is the question.

OATH OF INFORMANT

I, Martin Lamothe, of the Province of Ontario, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have reasonable grounds to believe and do believe that the persons named herein have committed the offences set out in the counts above, and that this information is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SWORN (OR AFFIRMED) before me

this _____ day of _____, A.D. 2026

at _____, Ontario

_____ _____

_____

Justice of the Peace
Province of Ontario

_____

Martin Lamothe, Informant
The Heir, acting in person
Citoyen de droit — Civis jure proprio

SCHEDULE 1

CROWN COMMUNICATIONS — FORENSIC EVIDENCE RECORD

THREAT · INTIMIDATION · EXTORTION · PRIVATE PROPERTY

Referred to in Evidence item (p) of this Information

I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THIS SCHEDULE

This Schedule preserves, authenticates, and analyzes two Crown communications issued to the informant, an Heir holding a valid Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL/RPAL) under the Firearms Act, R.S.C. 1995, c. 39. Each communication was transmitted by the RCMP Canadian Firearms Program on behalf of Public Safety Canada via the official Government of Canada notification infrastructure (notification.canada.ca / amazonses.com).

These communications are adduced not as administrative correspondence but as affirmative evidence that the Crown, through its agents, communicated conditions — compliance, disposal, deactivation, or criminal consequence — to a natural person whose prior lawful possession of private property was never constitutionally extinguished. They are the Crown's own words, under the Crown's own seal, delivered to the informant's inbox, preserved intact.

II. CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC AUTHENTICATION

Both communications have been preserved by forensic extraction from an .mbox archive. The recipient identity has been redacted. All cryptographic authentication metadata has been retained intact and unmodified. The integrity of each communication is independently verifiable by any party possessing standard DKIM validation tooling. The cryptographic chain operates as follows: the sending domain notification.canada.ca signed each message with RSA-SHA256 (2048-bit key) under DKIM. Amazon SES (the Crown's delivery infrastructure) countersigned with a 1024-bit RSA-SHA256 key. Both signatures passed DMARC evaluation (p=reject; dis=none) at the recipient mail server. SPF also passed on bounce.notification.canada.ca. This three-layer verification — DKIM (sender domain), DKIM (transit relay), DMARC (policy enforcement) — establishes authenticity to the standard required for admissibility of electronic evidence. The Crown cannot deny authorship.

A. Piece 1 of 2 — Initial Notice (21 January 2026)

From: rcmp.cfp.grc.pcaf@notification.canada.ca

Date: Wednesday, 21 January 2026, 11:31:57 +0000 (UTC)

Message-ID: <010d019be05359f7-9ff5764a-87e3-4a7a-b990-49880d3872c3-000000@ca-central-1.amazonses.com>

DKIM selector: wrtaqi2wdu42zqjzyf3ikn46kzos4f76 @ notification.canada.ca (2048-bit, rsa-sha256)

DKIM body hash (bh=): 0Wdg1f63bi4EiGjC+IgLW8QE/Z9DfkODQsEIc24STEQ=

DMARC result: pass (p=reject dis=none) header.from=notification.canada.ca

SPF result: pass smtp.mailfrom=bounce.notification.canada.ca

Transit IP: 23.249.208.112 (d208-112.smtp-out.ca-central-1.amazonses.com)

B. Piece 2 of 2 — Final Reminder (20 March 2026)

From: rcmp.cfp.grc.pcaf@notification.canada.ca

Date: Friday, 20 March 2026, 15:04:11 +0000 (UTC)

Message-ID: <010d019d0bc67fe5-6f0e72f8-76a8-4b2a-b796-505ad1a7c4fa-000000@ca-central-1.amazonses.com>

DKIM selector: wrtaqi2wdu42zqjzyf3ikn46kzos4f76 @ notification.canada.ca (2048-bit, rsa-sha256)

DKIM body hash (bh=): 8EX5ZbDj1crN83ne8nejGx9onB4YtkvbUTeiw2mZIO8=

DMARC result: pass (p=reject dis=none) header.from=notification.canada.ca

SPF result: pass smtp.mailfrom=bounce.notification.canada.ca

Transit IP: 23.249.208.115 (d208-115.smtp-out.ca-central-1.amazonses.com)

III. WHAT THE CROWN SAID: THE OPERATIVE DEMAND

Read together, the two communications establish the following sequence of Crown conduct in its own words: (1) The Crown identified the informant as a PAL holder and communicated directly regarding privately owned property, characterizing it as "prohibited" by executive classification; (2) The Crown presented a binary: participate in the Assault-Style Firearms Compensation Program (declaration period January 19 – March 31, 2026) or dispose of / deactivate privately held property by October 30, 2026 without compensation; (3) The Crown explicitly warned that failure to comply "places you at risk of losing your Possession and Acquisition Licence and criminal liability," including "prison sentences, permanent criminal records, and restrictions on future firearm ownership;" (4) The Final Reminder reiterated all conditions and confirmed the amnesty end date of October 30, 2026, after which criminal prosecution would follow as a matter of stated Crown policy.

The Crown's own language discloses the structure: "While the compensation program is voluntary, compliance with the law is not." That sentence is the complete architecture of Count 5. The threat (criminal prosecution) is explicit. The demand (disposal or deactivation) is explicit. The absence of constitutional authority to make that demand of an Heir holding a pre-existing liberty is established by the entirety of the Particulars above. The three elements of extortion under section 346(1) of the Criminal Code are satisfied on the face of the Crown's own communications.

IV. THE COMPENSATION OFFER DOES NOT CURE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT

The Crown's framing — "the ASFCP is the option for law-abiding firearms owners to receive fair compensation" — proceeds from a premise the constitutional record does not support. An Heir is not obliged to accept monetary payment as a substitute for a pre-existing constitutional liberty. The compensation program is voluntary. The disposal obligation is not. The choice offered to the informant was: sell back what was never the Crown's to buy, or dispose of it for nothing, or become a criminal. That is not a constitutional choice. It has the characteristics of a demand backed by a threat.

The program itself confirms the constitutional defect. Compensation is awarded on a "first come, first served" basis; "submitting a declaration does not guarantee you will receive compensation." A constitutional liberty cannot be redeemed on a first-come, first-served basis subject to fund availability. That is not extinguishment with compensation. It has the characteristics of administrative expropriation of uncertain quantum, grounded on instruments that the informant alleges are void as against the Heir class.

V. EVIDENTIARY CONCLUSION

The two Crown communications preserved in this Schedule establish four propositions:

(i) The Crown communicated, to the informant by name via PAL registry, demands for compliance, disposal, deactivation, or participation in a compensation scheme in respect of privately held property;

(ii) The Crown explicitly threatened criminal liability, PAL revocation, and imprisonment for non-compliance;

(iii) The Crown did so without identifying, in the communications or the underlying instruments, the constitutional mechanism by which the pre-existing liberty of Heirs was extinguished; and

(iv) The communications are cryptographically authenticated by dual DKIM signatures and pass DMARC and SPF verification, establishing Crown authorship to an evidentiary standard that admits of independent third-party verification and that the Crown cannot rebut.

Quod non habet principium non habet finem.

That which has no beginning has no end.
